System safety
Traceability that survives review: from hazard to accepted evidence
Most programmes have traceability on paper. Fewer can follow a single hazard to the verification that closed it without a manual reconstruction.
CRA readiness · · 6 min read
The reporting duties arrive well before the main obligations. They are the first point where a product organisation is measured on process, not intention.
The Cyber Resilience Act phases in over several years, and the first hard operational date concerns reporting. From 11 September 2026, manufacturers of products with digital elements must notify actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe incidents affecting the security of their products. The timelines are short: an early warning within 24 hours and a fuller notification within 72 hours.
For most organisations the difficulty is not understanding the requirement. It is that a 24-hour clock exposes every unowned step in the chain between a security signal arriving and a decision being made.
Almost every reporting failure we see in rehearsals traces back to the same gap: the organisation cannot say quickly which shipped versions contain the affected component, which customers run them, and whether a fix path exists. This is where SBOM work stops being a documentation exercise and becomes an operational capability. If the component inventory is not queryable within hours, the 72-hour notification will be vague — and vagueness is visible.
The reporting duty is narrow, but passing it requires most of the underlying CRA machinery: risk assessment, secure development practice, update and support definitions, and coordinated disclosure. Teams that treat September 2026 as a compliance form to fill in tend to discover the missing lifecycle work at the worst possible moment. Teams that rehearse the flow discover it early, in a meeting, where it is cheap to fix.
Run one tabletop exercise on a realistic vulnerability. The gaps it exposes are your actual readiness roadmap.
None of this requires a large programme to begin. It requires ownership, a written process and one honest rehearsal.
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System safety
Most programmes have traceability on paper. Fewer can follow a single hazard to the verification that closed it without a manual reconstruction.
Engineering practice
When safety and product security work in separate structures, the contradictions surface late — usually in a customer review.
CRA readiness
The template for a technical documentation pack is public. What is not public is which sections a reviewer actually reads twice.
CRA readiness
The first SBOM run is usually a success. The second one, three months later, is where the gap between having a tool and having a process becomes visible.
System safety
Run separately, the two standards produce two item definitions, two review cadences and two sets of evidence that quietly contradict each other.
System safety
A hazard analysis that stops at a mitigation statement has done half the job. The other half is writing something a test engineer can act on.
CRA readiness
Most organisations can produce a vulnerability handling policy on request. Fewer can produce evidence that it was followed on the last three findings.
System safety
A safety case is usually written as an argument about a specific, frozen configuration. Continuous updates make that assumption false on day one.