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GLOSSARY

ASIL

Automotive Safety Integrity Level

ASIL is assigned during hazard analysis and risk assessment by combining three factors for a given hazardous event: severity of potential harm, exposure to the operating situation, and controllability by the driver or other person. The combination maps to one of four integrity levels, ASIL A through D, or to QM where dedicated safety measures are not required.

The four ASIL levels

LevelRisk of the hazardous eventWhat it changes in engineering rigour
QMNo unreasonable risk identified for the hazardous eventQuality management alone; no ISO 26262 safety measures required
ASIL ALowest level within scope of the standardBasic systematic requirements, verification and review
ASIL BModerateAdded analysis and test coverage expectations, more review discipline
ASIL CHighStronger architectural measures, diagnostic coverage and independence in verification
ASIL DHighestMost demanding analysis, coverage, independence and confirmation measures
Levels as defined in ISO 26262. The rigour column summarises the intent of the standard's requirements, not a verbatim clause.

How the level is derived

ParameterQuestion it answersTypical scale
Severity (S)How badly could people be harmed?S0 to S3
Exposure (E)How often does the operating situation occur?E0 to E4
Controllability (C)Can the driver or another person avoid the harm?C0 to C3
Severity, exposure and controllability are each rated on their own scale in the hazard analysis; the combination determines the level.

How it is used

The assigned ASIL determines the rigour expected of subsequent development activities: the depth of requirements decomposition, the independence expected between development and verification roles, the analysis techniques applied to the architecture, and the coverage expected from testing. A higher ASIL does not change what the system must do; it changes how much confidence the evidence must provide that it does it.

  • ASIL decomposition allows a requirement to be split across redundant elements with lower individual levels, provided independence is demonstrated.
  • ASIL is attached to safety goals, then inherited by the requirements and architectural elements that implement them.
  • Evidence expectations — reviews, analyses, test methods — scale with the assigned level rather than being fixed project-wide.

In practice, the classification is only as trustworthy as the hazard analysis behind it. Assessors expect to see the reasoning for severity, exposure and controllability recorded, not just the resulting letter.