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COMPARISON · Standards

ISO 26262 vs IEC 61508

Most sector-specific safety standards, including ISO 26262, adapt the same underlying IEC 61508 lifecycle to their domain's terminology and risk classification.

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What is different

  • Domain: IEC 61508 is generic and applies across industries that have no more specific derived standard; ISO 26262 applies specifically to road vehicles' electrical and electronic systems.
  • Integrity classification: IEC 61508 uses Safety Integrity Levels (SIL 1–4) based on probability of dangerous failure; ISO 26262 uses Automotive Safety Integrity Levels (ASIL A–D, plus QM) derived from severity, exposure and controllability of the automotive hazard.
  • Lifecycle detail: ISO 26262 provides substantially more automotive-specific detail, including part-specific requirements for hardware, software, production and supporting processes tailored to vehicle development and supply chains.
  • Risk analysis method: IEC 61508 leaves the hazard and risk assessment method largely open; ISO 26262 specifies a defined method (severity, exposure, controllability) to derive ASIL ratings consistently across the automotive industry.

What overlaps

ISO 26262 is explicitly built on the same core concepts as IEC 61508: a safety lifecycle from concept through decommissioning, systematic and random hardware failure management, a safety case built from claims and evidence, and V-model-based development with verification and validation at each stage. Techniques for avoiding systematic failures — diverse redundancy, defensive programming, structured testing — are shared between the two, and competence and independence requirements for safety assessment follow a similar logic.

Both standards also share the principle that the integrity level drives the rigour of the process, not just the design: a high SIL or ASIL requires more independent verification, more structured analysis and more documented evidence, not simply a stronger design.

Which applies to you

  • You develop electrical, electronic or programmable electronic safety-related systems for road vehicles: ISO 26262 is the applicable standard.
  • You develop safety-related systems for a sector with its own derived standard (e.g. IEC 61511 for process industry, IEC 62061 for machinery, IEC 61513 for nuclear): use that derived standard, which itself traces back to IEC 61508.
  • You develop safety-related systems for a sector with no derived standard: IEC 61508 applies directly.
  • You supply a generic electronic component (e.g. a microcontroller or power module) into multiple sectors including automotive: qualify it against IEC 61508 generically and provide the specific evidence automotive customers need to build their own ISO 26262 case, since component-level qualification does not automatically confer an ASIL rating.

Frequently asked questions

Is ISO 26262 a version of IEC 61508?

ISO 26262 is a separate, standalone standard, but it was developed as the automotive-specific adaptation of IEC 61508's principles and shares its underlying safety lifecycle concept, adapted with automotive-specific risk classification and process detail.

How does ASIL relate to SIL?

ASIL and SIL are not directly interchangeable through a simple conversion table, because they are derived using different risk parameters — SIL from failure probability targets, ASIL from severity, exposure and controllability specific to the automotive hazard. Any mapping between them requires careful justification.

Can a component certified to IEC 61508 be used in an ISO 26262 system?

Yes, in principle, and this is common practice for generic electronic components. The integrator must still perform the ISO 26262-specific safety analysis and demonstrate that the component's IEC 61508 evidence supports the required ASIL in its specific automotive application.

Does ISO 26262 cover cybersecurity?

No. ISO 26262 addresses functional safety only. Automotive cybersecurity is addressed separately by ISO/SAE 21434, and the two need to be coordinated where a security compromise could affect a safety function.